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NOTES
SPEEDY TRIAL SCHEMES AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DELAY
The guarantee of a speedy trial for criminal defendants has long
been recognized by the common law of England1 and by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.2 Heavy burdens, however, have been placed
upon an accused who claims that he has been denied a speedy trial;
American courts have traditionally been reluctant to place any affirma-
tive duty upon the state to bring a criminal defendant promptly to
trial.3
Today problems of delayed justice have reached massive propor-
tions4 and have prompted court administrators and legislators to
1 The MACNA CHARTA, 25 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1297), states: "We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31
Car. 2, c. 2; W. BLACKSroNE, COMIMENTARIES *438; text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
2 U.S. CONSr. amend. VI. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey,
393 US. 374 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Smith v. United States,
360 U.S. 1 (1959); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198
U.S. 77 (1905). The Supreme Court in 1967 declared that the sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
3 See notes 15-28 and accompanying text infra.
4 As of June 30, 1970, more than 6,000 federal district court criminal cases (30% of
all pending cases) had been awaiting trial for one year or more, although about one-half
of these backlog cases involved fugitive defendants. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNr ED
STATES, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT 1970, at 155-57 (1971). The report characterized those district courts with greater
than 30% of their criminal cases pending one year or more as facing an "emergency"
situation; included in this group were the New York Southern, West Virginia Southern,
New York Western, Rhode Island, Alabama Southern, and New Jersey districts. Id.
On December 13, 1970, Bernice Just of the American Friends Service Committee and
a group of law students interviewed 597 men awaiting trial in District of Columbia jails.
She reported that
[olne had been confined 35 months, 11 others in excess of 18 months, and another
11 for a full year or more. Still another 72 men had been in jail for at least six
months ....
[.. N]early 70 percent of defendants with cases pending in the US. District
Court had been confined at least three months, including 10 percent jailed at least
one year.
Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. According to
Just, "[Ihe total detention experience is worse for unconvicted defendants whose legal
status is ambiguous, than for those adjudged guilty and committed to prison." Id. at 88.
Critics placed much of the blame for the New York City jail riots in 1970 on the fact
that 40% of the inmates had been waiting one year or more for trial. See N.Y. Times,
March 8, 1971, at 69, col. 1.
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attempt redefinition of the nature of the speedy trial guarantee. Various
schemes, implemented by either court rules5 or statutes,6 have recently
set specific time limits within which an accused must be brought to
trial. Although these plans are primarily concerned with fairness to
the accused-especially the accused who is incarcerated prior to trial 7-
they also seek to reduce the high cost of delay to the community.s In
addition, they may make preventive detention9 unnecessary and may
5 E.g., 2D Cm. RuLEs REGARDING PROMPT DsrPosrrION OF CRIM. CASES [hereinafter citedf
as 2n Cm. R.]; Amuz. R. Cmf. P. 236; FLA. R. CGlu. P. 3.191; IND. R. Cpum. P. 4; N.M.fl
Civ. P. 95.
In New York a speedy trial rule was promulgated by the state's Judicial Conference
in April, 1971 and was to have become effective on May 2, 1972. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29. The
rule never took effect, however, because in April, 1972 the state legislature passed a
substitute measure explicitly superseding the Judicial Conference rule. Ch. 184, [1972]
N.Y. Laws 398. State legislators apparently were unwilling to provide adequate resources
for implementation of the Judicial Conference rule (requiring a time limit for trials)
and replaced it with a statute dealing only with prosecutorial delay. See note 135 infra.
This Note will cite various provisions of the now superseded Judicial Conference rule,
both because it represents an enlightened approach to the problem of delayed justice
and because it was politically significant as a stimulus to legislative change. Unfortunately,
the legislative response in New York was less than satisfactory. See notes 113 & 114 and
accompanying text infra.
6 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-
Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1972); NEv. Rxv. STAT. § 178.556 (1969);
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10 (1971); ch. 184, [1972]U
N.Y. Laws 398. .
7 Most speedy trial schemes require that prisoners incarcerated pending trial be
brought to trial within a shorter time than those who have been released on bail or on
personal recognizance. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
The burdens imposed on the defendant by court delay are severe:
The defendant's memory of the events in issue fades, potential defense witnesses
disappear, and other evidence becomes available [sic]. The human costs of delay
are staggering, especially when the defendant is unable to secure his pretrial re-
lease and must remain in jail awaiting trial. Loss of employment, disruption of
family and other relationships, and continuing anxiety are the frequent accom-
paniment of prolonged delay in a criminal case. Even if the defendant is at length
acquitted, he can never fully recover what he has lost by reason of delay.
Hearings 33 (testimony of D. A. Rezneck of the American Civil Liberties Union).
8 It costs thousands of dollars of public funds to keep a defendant in jail for a
year while he awaits his trial. Furthermore, a speedy trial is the most effective
weapon against crime yet developed. Swift trial, conviction, and sentencing of the
guilty are a major deterrent to crime. Delay destroys this deterrent.
Failure to provide a speedy trial also greatly impedes the rehabilitation of
convicted persons. The sooner the process of rehabilitation begins in the case of a
guilty defendant, the better its chances for success.
Trial delays are also unfair to victims and other witnesses of crimes. They
necessitate repeated trips to court, often at the cost of a day's wages the victim
or defendant can not afford to lose. Eventually such persons may simply give up
and stop coming. The result is a miscarriage of justice and an erosion of confidence
in the judicial process ....
Id. 33-34.
9 See notes 145-47 and accompanying text infra.
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compel state legislatures to allocate more resources to judicial opera-
tions.10 Their ultimate goal is to ensure justice without delay in all
criminal prosecutions."
This note will explore the likelihood that these schemes will suc-
ceed. Some speedy trial plans are inherently unable to cure the major
problems of delayed justice 2 and others, though potentially effective,
may fail for inadequate financing. Moreover, there is the latent dange
in almost all these plans that inadequate judicial resources couple
with strict time limits may lead to procedural "short-cutting."'13 Indeed,
speedy trial proposals may be seen by some policy makers as invitations,
or at least opportunities, to attack legislatively or judicially what they
regard as the true cause of court congestion and delay-the extensive
substantive and procedural rights afforded the criminal defendant.14
I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL:
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
In a recent case a North Carolina court stated that
[u]ndue delay cannot be defined in terms of days, months, or even
years. The length of the delay, the cause of the delay, prejudice
to the defendant, and waiver by the defendant are interrelated
10 See notes 131-44 and accompanying text infra.
11 Existing speedy trial schemes, however, do not uniformly ensure this result. Some
a speedy trial or else waive his right. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text infra. Others
(e.g., INi. R. Ca. P. 4) only protect the accused from prosecutorial delay, thereby ex-
cluding passive delay caused by court congestion. See notes 105-30 and accompanying text
infra. Still other schemes (e.g., WASH. RIv. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961)) provide broad
"good cause" exceptions to the guarantee (i.e., the time limit is tolled during delay shown
to be for good cause). Such exceptions to the speedy trial guarantee facilitate state avoidance
of an affirmative duty to provide speedy trials. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 89-130 infra. Some prosecutors feel that speedy trial
schemes will encourage defendants who might otherwise plead guilty to seek trial, hoping
for mandatory dismissal by failure of the state to meet the deadlines. Since nearly 90%
of all criminal prosecutions are currently disposed of by guilty pleas (PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMiENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CrImE
IN A FREE SOrr 134 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRraE Cormw'N REPORT]), these critics
feel that such schemes will further delay rather than speed up the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Hearings 113 (statement of W. H. Rehnquist, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral); N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, at 61, col. 1. Such concern, however, is misplaced if a
judicial system is provided with sufficient resources to ensure that court congestion will not
lead to massive noncompliance with deadlines and thus to mass dismissals. See notes 131-44
and accompanying text infra.
13 See notes 148-52 and accompanying text infra.
14 See note 152 infra.
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factors to be considered in determining whether a trial has been
unduly delayed. The burden is on the accused who asserts the
denial of his right to a speedy trial to show that the delay was due
to the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.15
The component parts of this statement provide a focus for analysis of
the traditional and still prevailing view of the constitutional speedy
trial guarantee.
A. Length of the Delay
The Supreme Court in 1905 noted that "[t]he right of a speedy
trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances."'16 No precise time limit is expressed in the Con-
stitution, nor have judicial decisions provided such a limit. The "es-
sential ingredient" of the guarantee, in fact, has been said to be "orderly
expedition, and not mere speed."'17 In some cases, however, if an "un-
reasonably" long delay occurs between indictment and trial, the de-
fendant has been relieved of his burden of proving prejudice owing to
the delay.'
8
B. Cause of the Delay
A defendant who by his own motions, continuances, or dilatory
tactics causes a delay in bringing his case to trial cannot later claim that
he was denied a speedy trial.19 Even when the prosecution is the cause
of the delay, the defendant often must prove that the delay was "pur-
'5 State v. Ball, 277 N.C. 714, 717, 178 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1971).
16 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
17 Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959). In McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d
984 (10th Cir. 1940), defendant was arrested and held in jail 10 months while awaiting
trial. Because there were other criminal cases to be tried ahead of his, defendant was held
not to have been denied his right to a speedy trial.
18 E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
880 (1958); United States v. Blanca Perez, 310 F. Supp. 550, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United
States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Hedgepeth v. United States, 364
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court stated that "the very assumption of the Sixth Amend-
ment is that unreasonable delays are by their nature prejudicial. It is not generally neces-
sary for the defendant to demonstrate affirmatively how he has been prejudiced by an
unreasonable delay." Id. at 687 n.3. For a discussion of prejudice caused by delay, see notes
23-26 and accompanying text infra.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 803- (1962) (defendant twice requested adjournment and acquiesced in repeated ad-
journments by the government); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 US. 880 (1958) (delay of more than five years between indictment and
trial owing largely to defendant's own motions held not to constitute violation of sixth
amendment); Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966
(1956) (delay caused by the dilatory motions of the defendant not a denial of speedy trial).
1972]
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poseful or oppressive." 20 If the prosecution has not willfully caused the
delay and is not grossly negligent in its duties, delay will generally be
excused.2 1 It follows that if the prosecution is prepared to proceed with
the case and delay is caused only by the congested condition of the
criminal calendar, the defendant has no grounds to contend that he
was denied his constitutional right to a prompt trial.22
C. Burden of Proving Prejudice
Under the traditional approach, before an accused may claim he
was denied a speedy trial, he must allege and prove that he was preju-
diced by the delay.23 Only in the rare case will prejudice be presumed,
20 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). Some federal courts have adopted
a broader concept of inexcusable delay under the sixth amendment, one utilizing an "ar-
bitrary, purposeful, oppressive or vexatious" test. See Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In practice, however, this test like its predecessor excuses many de-
lays for which the defendant is in no way responsible. See, e.g., Hinton v. United States,
424 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (15-month delay owing to prosecution's honest but mistaken
belief that defendant was at large when he was actually in jail for another offense held
not arbitrary, purposeful, oppressive, or vexatious); Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151
(4th Cir. 1955) (10-month delay between indictment and trial held acceptable since trial
held as soon as orderly conduct of court's business permitted). But see Marshall v. United
States, 337 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (43-month delay occasioned by hung jury at first
trial and vacated judgment at second trial though not purposeful, held to be avoidable,
vexatious, and arbitrary).
21 See, e.g., Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (accidental two-year de-
lay in sentencing and therefore in completion of trial held not purposeful or oppressive
since promptly remedied on discovery); Hinton v. United States, 242 F.2d 876, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (institutional inefficiency in not locating defendant who was in jail on another
offense neither arbitrary, purposeful, oppressive, nor vexatious conduct on part of prosecu-
tion nor product of indifference); United States ex rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88,
91-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936 (1969) (11-month delay caused by mistake by
court or district attorney in believing first appointed counsel was still handling defendant's
case held not purposeful or oppressive); State v. Hadley, 249 S.W.2d 857, 862 (Mo. 1952)
(delay in initiating second trial because of belated discovery of fatal error in first trial
held to be no denial of constitutional right to a speedy trial since not the fault of pros-
ecution).
22 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed itself directly to this question. Chief
Justice Burger, however, writing for the majority in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
stated in dictum that court docket congestion and lack of judicial manpower may excuse
delay. Id. at 38. In King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998
(1959), a delay of five months attributable to court congestion was held constitutional.
See also McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1940); State v. Ball, 277 N.C. 714,
178 S.E.2d 377 (1971); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoLum. L. Rxv. 846,
857-59 (1957).
23 See, e.g., Harling v. United States, 401 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1068 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1966); United
States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1963).
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and then only if the delay is prima facie unreasonable.2 Despite
Supreme Court dicta broadly delineating the dangers of trial delay,20J
prejudice is often interpreted very narrowly-only delay which harms
the defendant's ability to prepare his defense may be considered truly
prejudicial.
2 6
D. Waiver and the Demand Rule
Traditional constitutional doctrine holds that an accused impliedly
waives his right to a speedy trial by not asserting that right during the
period of delay.27 Presumably the purpose of such a rule is to prevent
a defendant from alleging constitutional violation when he earlier
acquiesced in the delay for his own advantage. 2
8
24 See, e.g., United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 850 US.
857 (1955); note 18 and accompanying text supra.
25 E.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), which described the sixth amend-
ment as "an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." Id.
at 120.
26 King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 859 U.S. 998 (1959),
held a post-indictment delay not to constitute a denial of a speedy trial, in part because
"[t]he defendant's case was not prejudiced, even though he may have suffered hardship
from the delay." Id. at 570; accord, Porter v. United States, 270 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 863 U.S. 805 (1960). The Porter dissent, however, stated that lengthy pretrial
incarceration was itself prejudicial. Id. at 455.
In Bynum v. United States, 408 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 935
(1969), it was held that no prejudice had been proved even though a prima fade case
of undue delay-one and a half years between arrest and trial-had been presented. The
court reasoned that "no substantial possibility appears in this case that the defense was
weakened due either to the unavailability or diminished recollection of witnesses." Id. at
1209.
Similarly, in United States v. Verville, 281 F. Supp. 591 (ED. Wis. 1968), defendant's
conviction was reversed and his case remanded for a pretrial hearing. The pretrial hearing
was delayed for 21 months owing to unavailability of a judge and calendar congestion. The
accused alleged that he was prejudiced by the delay in that pending charges created
personal anxiety, aroused public suspicion, damaged his reputation, and led to legal ex-
pense. The court held that prejudice "in the constitutional sense" had not occurred since
the defendant had "not alleged impairment of memory or loss of witnesses." Id. at 593.
But cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1971) (possibility of prejudice to
defendant's case not sufficient reason to extend sixth amendment to prearrest delay).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1967); Mathias v. United
States, 374 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151, 153 (4th Cir.
1955). These cases hold that the right to a speedy trial is personal and may be waived.
Failure to object to a continuance requested by the prosecution has also been held to
constitute a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 157
F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1946).
28 See Note, supra note 22, at 853.
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II
MINORITY EROSION OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW:
THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY CONCEPT
To avoid the harsh results of placing such a heavy burden on the
accused, a significant number of judges over the years have evidenced
a willingness to question and change accepted notions of the speedy
trial guarantee. By abandonment of the traditional constitutional view,
some judges would in effect place on the state an affirmative duty to
provide an expeditious criminal justice system even in the absence of
a speedy trial plan.29 In a strong dissent from a District of Columbia
Circuit decision holding that a crowded criminal calendar justified an
otherwise unreasonable delay, Chief Judge Bazelon wrote:
[T]he application of [the sixth amendment], providing that "the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial," does not turn
on the question of responsibility. Even if no agency or instrumental-
ity of the Government is responsible for the delay, where there
has in fact been a substantial delay not of the defendant's own
choosing... there has in law been a denial of a speedy trial.
30
29 Interpreting the right to a speedy trial under the United States and Alaska Con-
stitutions, the Alaska Supreme Court recently rejected the demand rule, held that court
congestion did not justify delay, and presumed prejudice from a 14-month delay between
arrest and trial. Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alas. 1971). Quoting Glasgow v. State,
469 P.2d 682 (Alas. 1970), the court construed the constitutional right to a speedy trial
as placing "a positive duty .. .upon the courts and prosecutors to see that criminal
defendants are afforded a speedy trial." Id. at 949 (emphasis added). But see United
States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the Second Circuit reaffirmed the
demand rule and the actual prejudice test. When this case was decided the Second Circuit
had already promulgated its new rules which abolished these two conditions to the right.
See notes 95 & 99 and accompanying text infra. But the new rules had not yet become
effective at the time of the Smalls case and, in the absence of such rules, the court con-
tinued to interpret the constitutional right strictly.
30 King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, 572-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998
(1959) (emphasis in original). The King majority, although holding that the petitioner
had not been denied a speedy trial, did warn the government about not providing judicial
machinery to handle the criminal caseload: "If the legislature were to refuse to install
sufficient judicial machinery to perform the judicial tasks, it might be necessary to turn
some accused persons loose." Id. at 569. But the court added that "[a] method of dis-
position which reasonably accommodates practicalities is not illegal." Id. See also Falgout
v. Trujillo, 270 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1966), which held that the congested condition
of the criminal docket in the state court justified the accused's eight-month pretrial
prison term. But the court issued a caveat in these words:
[The court clerk] testified that petitioner's case was being processed no differently
from all of the other cases on the criminal docket. It is dear that there has to be
some point at which the period of delay becomes so intolerable that it is not
enough that one is being treated the same as other defendants. The Court is not
[Vol. 57:794
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In a case involving a 102-day delay between indictment and trial where
the defendant spent nearly six months in jail, the court held that since
the delay was not arbitrary or purposeful and since the defendant had
failed to demand a speedy trial, he had not been denied his sixth
amendment rights.3 1 Judge Wright, however, in a strong dissent
argued that
[u]nlike Continental concepts of criminal justice, under our law a
man charged with crime is presumed innocent. But, under today's
decision, an innocent man may be held in jail for almost six months
awaiting his trial. Under this ruling, for the first six months after
accusation, the presumption of innocence-and the right to a speedy
trial-mean very little to a defendant unable to make bond.32
The demand rule has also been attacked in some opinions, 3 and
the rule that a defendant must prove prejudice from the delay in
order to avail himself of the right to a prompt trial has similarly been
criticized as unduly harsh. 4 It is in the context of this limited judicial
questioning of traditional views on the right to a speedy trial35 and of
strong criticism of doctrines that harshly burden the criminal defendant
that new speedy trial schemes have developed.
prepared to say, however, that the eight month delay in petitioner's case constitutes
such a period.
Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
81 Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784, 787-89 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
82 Id. at 793.
33 According to Mr. Justice Brennan, "The accused has no duty to bring on his trial.
He is presumed innocent until proved guilty; arguably, he should be presumed to wish
to exercise his right to be tried quickly, unless he affrmatively accepts delay." Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 80, 50 (1970) (concurring opinion). In People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353,
130 NE.2d 891 (1955), the New York Court of Appeals stated that
[i]t is the state which initiates the action and it is the state which must see that
the defendant is arraigned. It is likewise the state which has the duty of seeing
that the defendant is speedily brought to trial. And from this it follows that the
mere failure of the defendant to take affirmative action to prevent delay may not,
without more, be construed or treated as a waiver.
Id. at 358, 130 N.E.2d at 895 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Mann, 291 F.
Supp. 268, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Cohen, Speedy Trial for Convicts: A Reexamination of the Demand Rule, 3 VAL-
PARAso L. Rzv. 197, 199-201 (1969). With regard to other constitutional rights waiver
must be voluntary and knowing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
84 [qoncrete evidence of prejudice is often not at hand. Even if it is possible
to show that witnesses and documents, once present, are now unavailable, proving
their materiality is more difficult. And it borders on the impossible to measure the
cost of delay in terms of the dimmed memories of the parties and available wit-
nesses.
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 80, 53 (1970) (concurring opinion). See Note, The Right to a
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476, 493-97 (1968); cf. note 18 supra.




SPEEDY TRIAL SCHEMES IN GENERAL
Speedy trial statutes are not a new phenomenon. The Habeas
' Corpus Act of 167936
enabled a person arrested to call upon his accuser to bring forward
his indictment the first session after his imprisonment, and to try
him on it at the next; on failure of which, he was, in the first in-
stance, entitled to bail, and in the last, to a final discharge from the
accusation. 37
In the United States, many states adopted some form of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679. 8S'The time limit was generally measured, as in
the Habeas Corpus Act, by the number of court terms that had elapsed.3 9
Today, however, these older statutes have proven unable to cope
with the immense problems of delayed criminal justice.40 For the most
part, judicial interpretation of these statutes has traced judicial inter-
pretation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial41 and there-
fore has placed heavy burdens on the accused to prove prejudice, to
comply with the demand rule, and to show "purposeful or oppressive"
prosecutorial delay.4 2 In other words, some state statutory provisions
36 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
37 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAw 87 (5th ed. 1794). See also United
States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196-97 (D. Md.), aff'd mere., 350 U.S. 857 (1955), describing
the E glish statutory background to the speedy trial guarantee.
38 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 545.890, .900 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 812 (1969).
9 For classifications of these older statutes according to the length of time between
intervals, see Note, supra note 22, at 851-52 nn.34-35. The federal courts have never
operated under a time limit system, although several proposals that they do so have recently
been put forward. See note 142 infra.
40 See note 4 supra.
41 See notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra.
42 WAH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961), which specifies a 60-day time limit for
tfral after indictment, has been interpreted to retain the demand rule. State v. Christensen,
75 Wash. 2d 678, 684, 453 P.2d 644, 648 (1969). If the prosecution shows "good cause"
for the initial delay, the defendant is shackled with the traditional requirements of proving
both prejudice and purposeful or oppressive conduct. See, e.g., State v. Garmen, 76 Wash.
2d 637, 641, 458 P.2d 292, 295 (1969). A congested trial docket has been held to be "good
cause" for delay beyond 60 days. State v. Dunn, 70 Wash. 2d 572, 576, 424 P.2d 897,
899-900 (1967).
/ Typical of the older statutes is the Oklahoma speedy trial statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 812 (1969). It states that if trial is not postponed on the application of the de-
-- fendant and if the defendant is not brought to trial in the next term of court in which
the indictment is triable after it is filed, the court must dismiss the indictment unless
good cause is shown for the delay. In Pickle v. Bliss, 418 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966),
it was held that the defendant must demand a speedy trial before he is entitled to relief
under the statute. Id. at 74. Furthermore, the defendant was deemed to have the burden
[Vol. 57:794
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for speedy trials, despite their more definite time limits, 43 have been
interpreted to include the same conditions as the constitutional right.
Although more modem speedy trial plans differ in details, certain
common characteristics can be identified, including the setting of
time limits, provisions for extension of the time limits, and sanctions
for failure to comply.
A. Time Limits
The American Bar Association's Standaids Relating to Speedy
Trial recommends that limits within which the accused must be brought
to trial should be set "in terms of days or months running from a
specified event."4' Some speedy trial plans distinguish between defen-
dants in custody awaiting trial and those free on bail or personal recog-
nizance. 5 Schemes providing for a shorter time limit in misdemeanor
of proving that delay was owing to laches on the part of the prosecution. Id. at 73. Al-
though the defendant in this particular case was able to rebut the presumption of lawful
cause for delay, his burden of proof was quite heavy in view of the explicit language of
the statute.
43 FED. R. Car. P. 48(b) sets no specific time limit in federal criminal prosecutions.
It reads:
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in
filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the
district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial,
the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
(emphasis added). Thus there is no federal parallel on either a procedural or substantive
level to state statutes setting definite time limits for trials. See notes 45-59 infra. But see
note 142 infra.
Thus far delay because of court congestion has not been considered a sufficient
ground for dismissal under Rule 48(b). The prejudice and the demand rules have con-
sistently been applied in federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Verville, 281 F. Supp.
591 (E.D. Wis. 1968). But see 2d Cm. R. 8. See also note 142 infra.
44 ABA PRojFcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDs]. The commentary
to section 2.1 notes that most older speedy trial plans expressed time limits according to
how many court terms had elapsed. Such schemes are criticized as causing "lack of uni-
formity throughout a jurisdiction and [being] difficult for defendants and counsel to
understand." Id. § 2.2, Comment at 14.
45 The New York Judicial Conference rules were typical of this approach. See note 5
supra. They provided that if a defendant was in custody and was not brought to trial within
90 days from the date of his arrest, he would be released on bail or his own recognizance.
22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.1. The section, however, did not apply to a defendant in prison for
other offenses or in custody pending trial on other charges with regard to which the 90
days had not yet elapsed. Section 29.2 provided that in any criminal prosecution other than
homicide, whether or not the defendant was in custody, unless he was tried within six
months from the date of his arrest, the charges would be dismissed. See also ABA STAN-
DARDs § 4.2. The current New York statute (see note 5 supra) and the Second Circuit rules
establish a similar dichotomy, but only require that the prosecution be ready for trial
within the specified limits. Ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 398-99; 2D. Cm. RR. 34.
Illinois provides that a defendant in custody must be brought to trial within 120 days
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cases are found in Californi 6 and Florida,47 and some plans specify
shorter limits or calendar preference for those accused of felonies. 48
Cfrom the date he was taken into custody and that a defendant released on bail or recogni-
zance must be tried within 160 days from the date he demands trial. ILL. ANN. SrAT. ch.
88 § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970). For a discussion of speedy trial plans which retain the
demand rule, see notes 96-104 and accompanying text infra.
Although the Florida rule distinguishes between felonies and misdemeanors (see note
, 7 ra), the same time limits apply whether the accused is held in custody or is free on
ba or recognizance pending trial. FLA. R. Cans. P. 3.191(a)(1); see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1382 (West 1970).
\ Under the Second Circuit's rules, criminal defendants incarcerated prior to trial are
,Aso given docket preference over criminal defendants released pending trial. 2D Cm. R. 1.
46 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970) provides for a 60-day time limit between
ftitment and trial on felony charges. A defendant accused of a misdemeanor must be
brought to trial within 30 days after he is arraigned if he is in custody, and otherwise
within 45 days after his arraignment. The new New York statute (ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y.
Laws 398) establishes different time limits depending on whether the charge is a felony
(six months), a misdemeanor carrying a possible sentence of more than three months
(90 days), a misdemeanor carrying a possible sentence of three months or less (60 days),
and a violation (30 days). If the prosecution is not ready for trial within these limits, a
motion to dismiss the charges must be granted. Those defendants incarcerated prior to
trial must be released from custody if the prosecution is not ready for trial within 90
days for felonies, 30 days for misdemeanors carrying a possible sentence of more than
three months, 15 days for misdemeanors carrying a possible sentence of three months or
less, or five days for violations. The time limits do not apply to those charged with
ho de. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10 (1971).
(r -7 FLA. R. CPm. P. 3.191 provides that without demand a defendant accused of a
fny must be tried within 180 days of indictment or information; one accused of a mis-
demeanor must be brought to trial within 90 days. In either case, however, if a defendant
demands a speedy trial, he must be tried within 60 days of the information or indictment.
See notes 96-104 and accompanying text infra.
48 ABA STANARDs § 1.1(b) recommends that calendar priority be given to those de-
fendants whose pretrial liberty is reasonably believed to present unusual risks. See 2D Cm.
R. l(b). The 1970 report of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended a
rule which would provide for a more prompt disposition of cases involving persons whose
pretrial liberty the United States Attorney believed to be dangerous. JUDiCIAL CONFEMNCE
Or THE UNrrED STATEs, supra note 4, at 56. Such a recommendation has been followed in
new FED. R. Caim. P. 50(b). See note 142 infra. Philadelphia established a special calendar
under which defendants charged with crimes of violence are brought to trial within 30
days of their indictments. See CRIM ComM'N REPORT 131.
All persons charged with a crime in New Mexico must be tried within six months of
the filing of the information or indictment (N.M.R. Civ. P. 95), but the courts are bound
/ to fix, within 90 days from the time of arrest, a trial date for all those charged with a
felony. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-4.1 (Supp. 1971). Dismissal of the charges, however, will
only occur if the trial is not commenced within six months. Id. For a discussion of sanc-
tions under the various speedy trial schemes, see notes 76-88 and accompanying text infra.
As bail reform progresses, "a greater number of defendants posing [serious threat
to society] will gain their pretrial liberty." ABA STANDARDS § 1.1, Comment at 11.
Opponents of preventive detention feel that effective speedy trial legislation may make
lengthy pretrial incarceration unnecessary. See note 145 infra. In analyzing how elimination
of excessive pretrial delay might prove an alternative to preventive detention, Senator
Sam Ervin stated, "If we must tolerate delays in trial, it would be better to delay the less
serious cases and speed up the trials of the felonies." 116 CONG. Rnc. 15,888 (1970).
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Florida, in an extremely intricate court rule,49 distinguishes not only
between defendants in and out of custody and between those accused of
felonies or misdemeanors, but also has a different time limit for those
who demand trial.50 Some proposals do not draw such distinctions be-
tween types of crime or defendants. 5'
Speedy trial plans also may be classified according to the time
from which the limitation period begins to run.5 2 Complicated time
calculations may be necessary if there is a mistrial53 or if the accused
is in jail for another conviction.M Generally, however, time limits run
either from the time the accused is taken into custody,55 the time of
arrest,56 or the time the information or indictment is filed.57 Prein-
Shorter time limits for trial of alleged misdemeanants probably reflects a view that
misdemeanor cases can be more easily processed through the criminal justice system.
Shorter time limits or docketing advantages for accused felons probably reflects the
notion that the criminal justice system should give primary attention to serious offenders.
In addition, it may be that accused felons, because of the possibly greater threat they pose
to society, are more frequently incarcerated prior to trial. Even if an accused felon is
released prior to trial, statistics show that he is less likely to commit another crime during
his release if he is quickly tried. See note 145 infra. Of course speedy trials for both accused
misdemeanants and felons are dearly most desirable.
40 FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.191F
50 See note 4 supra.
51 See, e.g., S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This bill provides that any defendant
charged with an offense against the United States be brought to trial within 60 days of
his arrest (or within 60 days of the filing of information or indictment). Id. § 3161.
Distinction is made neither between defendants in custody and those released pending
trial nor between those accused of felonies and those accused of misdemeanors. Excepted
from the time limits, however, are those charged with criminal offenses under the anti-
trust, securities, or tax laws of the United States. Id. § 3163(b).
52 The ABA suggests that unless the defendant was either held continuously in
custody or released on bail or recognizance prior to the filing, the time limit for trial
should commence from the date the charge is filed. When, however, the accused has been
held in custody before charges are fied based upon his alleged conduct in a criminal
episode, time should commence running at the date he was held to answer. ABA STANDARDS
§ 2.2.
Some schemes set other specific time limits for the various stages of the criminal
justice process. California, for example, provides that a person accused of a crime must
have an information filed against him within 15 days after he has been held to answer for
the offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(1) (West 1970). See also NEV. REv. STAT. § 178.556
(1969); CuAs COwM'N REPORT 155-56.
53 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(3) (West 1970).
54 E.g., FLA. R. Cmur. P. 3.191(b)(i)-(3).
55 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970); FILA. R. CIuM. P. 3.191(a)(1).
56 E.g., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 29.1-.2; see note 5 supra. But see ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y.
Laws 398-99 (time limit begins to run from the commencement of the criminal action for
dismissal of charges but from the date of commitment for release time limits).
57 E.g., N.M.R. Civ. P. 95.)
In the Second Circuit the time commences at either the date of arrest, service of sum.
mons, detention, or the filing of the charge, whichever is earliest. 2D CIR. R. 2. The pro-
posed federal statute provides that the time limit runs "from the date the defendant is
arrested or a summons is issued, except that if an information or indictment is filed, then
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dictment delay is generally excluded from the computation. 8 The
length of the time limits differs among the various arrangements, with
the shortest set at sixty days for felonies and thirty days for misde-
meanors. 59
within sixty days from the date of such filing. ... S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3161
(1971).
58 See, e.g., People v. Nettles, 107 Ill. App. 2d 143, 148-49 (1969). See also ABA
STANDmRS § 2.2(a), Comment at 23: "Allowing inquiry into when the police could have
arrested or when the prosecutor could have charged would raise difficult problems of
proof."
Although the sixth amendment's protection may extend to the period before formal
charges are filed, it does not reach the period before arrest. United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 321-22 (1971). But see United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (D. Alas. 1970);
United States v. Parrot, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965); United States v. Burke, 224 F.
Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1963). Unless a state's speedy trial formula extends to the prearrest or
preindictment periods, therefore, a defendant's only protection from preaccusation delay
is the statute of limitations. If purposeful delay by the prosecution results in actual pre-
judice, however, a defendant may show he was denied due process. United States v.
Marion, supra at 315 n.8.
9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(2)-(3) (West 1970). The California courts have in fact
ted under a 60-day limit since 1880. Ch. 47, § 106, [1880] Calif. Code Am. 29.
he proposed federal statute provides a 60-day time limit for trial of both felony
and misdemeanor cases. S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161 (1971). Some observers fear
that such a 60-day limit does not take into account the current capabilities of the federal
judiciary. Senator Charles H. Percy, a co-sponsor of S. 895, conceded that although 60
days is a desirable goal, a 60-day limit would currently be impossible to meet. He recom-
mended a 180-day limit. Hearings 66-67.
In New York, bills providing for various time limits within which a defendant must
be tried (as distinguished from time limits within which the prosecution must be ready
for trial (see note 45 supra)) have failed to get legislative support. See (1971) Sen. Int. No.
6047 (Rules Comm.); (1971) Assy. Int. No. 6189 (Mr. Walsh); (1971) Assy. Int. No. 4035
(Mr. Pisani). The time limits were criticized by Bronx District Attorney Burton B. Roberts
as both artificial and unrealistic. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, at 69, col. 1. The Judicial
Conference plan was thus promulgated in the form of a court rule setting such "time for
trial" deadlines (22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29) but was superseded by a statute adopting a "ready
rule." See note 5 supra; notes 113-14 and accompanying text infra.
Some time limits in effect in other states include ARz. R. Cant. P. 236 (60 days);
IND. R. ua. P. 4 (50 days from date of demand of defendant in custody, one year for
defendant not in custody); IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1972) (60 days after indictment);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 72 (1968) (six months for defendant in custody); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 178.556 (1969) (60 days after indictment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961)
(60 days); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10 (1971) (60 days for misdemeanors, 90 days from date of
demand for felonies).
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in
esting a model timetable for felony cases, recommended that the time between arrest
and trial should not exceed four months. CRImE CoMM' REPORT 154-56.
For a discussion of the relation of prompt trial plans to more efficient court ad-
ministration, see notes 148-49 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of how speedy
trial schemes might be used to compel greater legislative allocation of resources to the
judiciary, see notes 131-44 and accompanying text infra. Other typical speedy trial time-
tables are discussed in notes 44-48 & 51 supra.
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B. Extensions of the Time Limit: Exclusions, Continuances, and
"Good Cause"
Exceptions to a speedy trial formula, conditions which either toll
the running of the time limit or allow its extension, are important
considerations in evaluating the probable impact and effectiveness of
such schemes. In particular the "good cause" exception,"0 whether de-
fined specifically in the plan or by judicial interpretation, will determine
in many instances the extent of the state's affirmative duty6' to provide
speedy trials.
Although some formulations merely provide for time extensions
or tolling for "good cause" or "exceptional circumstances" without
further definition,62 some modem schemes state with some particularity
what periods of delay are to be excluded from computation.63 Typical
of specified exclusions from the running of the time limits are delay
resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, 64 con-
60 Under many speedy trial schemes, if the prosecution can show that its delay beyond
the time limit was for "good cause," such delay will be excused. See notes 62 & 71-73 infra.
For a discussion of good cause in a constitutional framework, see notes 20-22 and ac-
companying text supra.
61 See notes 89-130 and accompanying text infra.
62 E.g., N.M.R. Civ. P. 95 (2), which provides for extension of the six-month limit
"for good cause shown." Such an extension, however, can only be issued by a justice of
the state supreme court or a judge designated by the court. Either party may petition
for such an extension by filing with the court a petition which states with particularity
the facts deemed to constitute good cause. Id. (3).
The ABA does not recommend such a broad "good cause" exception:
In states with only a general "good cause" provision or with a far from complete
listing of proper bases for delay, the appellate courts-and presumably the trial
courts-have found the task of determining what events justify extension of the
statutory limits a most difficult one.
ABA STmNARVs § 2.1, Comment at 15; see note 63 infra.
63 Under the ABA proposal "[c]ertain periods of necessary delay should be excluded
in computing the time for trial, and these should be specifically identified by rule or
statute insofar as is practicable." ABA STANmARDs § 2.1 (emphasis added).
64 E.g., ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 399-400, which states that the following period
will not be computed in the time limit formula:
[A] reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning
the defendant, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of
his competency and the period during which defendant is incompetent to stand
trial; pretrial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the period during
which such matters are under consideration by the court ....
See also 2D CIR. R. 5(a); FRA. R. Cium. P. 3.191(d)(2)(iv); ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(a). Similar
to the New York and Second Circuit rules on this matter is the proposed federal statute,
S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2161(c)(1) (1971). It does not, however, specifically exclude
from calculation the period during which other proceedings concerning the defendant are
under consideration by the court. Cf. Hearings 35 (testimony of D. A. Rezneck):
If a Judge takes a pretrial motion under advisement after hearing, for example,
the time between the hearing and his decision of the motion should not be ex-
cluded from the 60 day period. Such motions are often held under advisement
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tinuances granted upon application of the defendant or with his con-
sent,65 and continuances granted to enable the prosecution to obtain
specific material evidence impossible to gather within the time limit.66
Absence or unavailability of the defendant during the time period
generally tolls the running of the statute.67 If a defendant is joined for
for long periods, and extension of the 60 day limitation for such a purpose would
thwart the purpose of the limitation.[65 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(2) (West 1970). The defendant who requests a con-
tiuance cannot later logically claim a statutory violation because of the resultant delay.
His consent to a continuance may be either express or implied from his silent acquiescence
in a delay. In either case, if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he will not be
deemed to have consented to a delay unless the court has explained to him his rights
and the effect of his consent. Id. § 1382(3). The Second Circuit rules provide that a con-
tinuance at defendant's request be granted only after a consideration of whether the post-
ponement is in the "interest of justice, taking into account the public interest in the prompt
disposition of criminal charges." 2D Cm. R. 5(b); see ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400;
ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(c).
Under the proposed federal statute, only upon a showing of good cause will a con-
tinuance be granted to the defendant. The request would have to be made at least 15
days prior to the date set for trial, and the maximum duration would be seven days.
S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161(c)(6) (1971). Since the purpose of such continuances is
usually to obtain key witnesses, one commentator has suggested that such a seven-day limit
be omitted. Hearings 85 (testimony of D. A. Rezneck). If the limit were abandoned
for the defendant, however, the prosecution would also be able to obtain unlimited con-
tinuances upon a showing of good cause; court congestion itself might qualify as good
cause. See notes 105-80 and accompanying text infra. The 15-day provision was evidently
added to S. 895 to prevent unjustified last minute stalling by either the defendant or the
prosecution. But often the necessity for a continuance becomes apparent only shortly be-
fore trial. See Hearings 68-69 (testimony of Senator C. Percy).
( 6 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(c) (Smith-Hurd 1970). The Illinois provision, as
w I as others that contain this specific exclusion from the time limit (e.g., 2D CmI. R.
5(c(i); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.3(c)(1); ABA STANDARDS § 2.8(d)(i)), condition the continuance
on the prosecution's diligence in seeking to obtain the evidence within the time limit
and the existence of reasonable grounds to believe the evidence can only be obtained at
a later date. In Illinois the maximum length of such a continuance is 60 days. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(c) (Smith-Hurd 1970). Florida permits the prosecution only two
continuances on this ground. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.191(f)(iii). The proposed federal statute
makes no explicit mention of a continuance to obtain material evidence, although the
prosecution may obtain a continuance upon a showing of good cause under the same
conditions as the defendant. See S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3161(c)(7) (1970); note 65
supra.
647. E.g., FLA. R. Crat. P. 3.191(a)(1). Periods during which the defendant is absent
orkunavailable are also excluded from the computation of the time limit in the proposed
federal statute. S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161(c)(3) (1971); see 2D Cmi. R. 5(d); ch. 184,
§ 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400. ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(e) stipulates that a defendant is absent
"whenever his whereabouts are unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence."
The "due diligence" wording is designed to prevent intentional delay in prosecution
under a spurious excuse of defendant's absence. The defendant is unavailable "whenever
his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained or he resists
being returned to the state for trial." Id.
SPEEDY TRIAL SCHEMES
trial with a codefendant whose time limit has not run and good cause
is shown for not granting a severance, resulting delay to the first de-
fendant is often excluded from computation.68 Some rules and statutes
exclude certain periods from computation or extend the time limit
when a defendant is in jail pending trial on other charges or serving
a sentence for a prior conviction.69 Periods during which the defendant
is without counsel are sometimes excluded from computation.70
Generally, after enumerating a series of specified exclusions and
grounds for continuances, speedy trial schemes adopt a discretionary
catchall ground for continuances stated in, terms of a showing of "good
cause"71 or "exceptional circumstances." 72 Illinois has certain specified
68 E.g., ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400; see S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161(c)(5)\
(1971); 2D Cm. R. 5(e); FLA. R. Car. P. 3.191(f)(v); ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(g).
69 A reasonable period of delay beyond the specified time limit is sanctioned by New
York if the defendant is detained in another jurisdiction and the prosecution has made rea-
sonably diligent efforts to obtain his presence for trial. Ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400.
See also 2o Cm. R. 5(f). The ABA recommends spedal procedures to be followed by the
prosecution to ensure that an accused person in prison in another jurisdiction is speedily
brought to trial. ABA STANDARDS § 3.1. Such procedures are particularly important in light
of Smith v. Hooey, 393 US. 374, 383 (1969), which held that a state is obliged under the
sixth amendment to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring an accused to trial on a
state charge if he is imprisoned in a federal institution or in another state's institution.
The Court's reasoning was that even though a person is in jail in another jurisdiction
he is prejudiced by not being tried on the new charge. Not only does delay hamper his
defense, but a speedy trial might enable him to serve his sentences concurrently and to
avoid the personal anxiety of a pending charge. Id. at 378-80. See also 2 CIR. R. 7.
Florida has instituted a complex scheme of different time limits for those who are
already incarcerated when charged. FLA. R. Csxai. P. 3.191. The time limits vary, depend-
ing on whether the accused is in prison in Florida or elsewhere and also on whether a
demand for trial is made. A Florida prisoner who does not demand trial must be tried
within one year if the crime charged is a misdemeanor or felony not involving violence,
and within two years if the crime charged is a capital offense or violent felony. Id.
§ 3.191(b)(1). Any Florida prisoner demanding trial, however, must be tried within six
months of his demand. Id. § (b)(2). Prisoners outside the jurisdiction must demand trial;
when they do, they must be tried within six months or a reasonable time from the time
the prosecution fies a detainer to secure presence for trial. Id. § (b)k8). See note 103 and
accompanying text infra. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.11 (1971).
70 2D Cm. R. 5(g) provides that a period during which a defendadlt is without counsel
will be excluded from computation of the time limit if his lack of counsel was not oc-
casioned by failure of the court to provide counsel for an indigent or the insistence of
the defendant to proceed pro se. See ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400. A defendant who
is not represented by counsel, in some schemes, may not be considered to have consented
to a continuance unless his rights are made known to him. Id. See discussion of the Cali-
fornia plan, note 65 supra.
71 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODn § 1382 (West 1970). New Mexico provides for no spedfic\
exclusions but continuances may be granted "for good cause shown." N.M.R. Cxv. P. 95.L
See note 62 supra.
Although it does not contain a general good cause provision, the proposed federal
statute provides for exclusion from the time limit of
[a]ny other period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request
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xclusions from the computation of the time limit, but provides no/gnea, "good cause" exception 7 8 Judicial interpretation of these "good
(cause" provisions will answer the question of whether court congestion
constitutes good cause for delay.74 Some plans specifically state that
general court congestion is not such an exceptional circumstance as to
excuse delay past the statutory time limit.75
of the defendant or his counsel or the United States attorney upon a finding by
the judge that, unless such a continuance is granted, the ends of justice cannot
be met. No such period of delay . . . shall be excludable . . . unless the court,
after first having considered the right of the defendant to a speedy trial and the
public interest in a prompt disposition of the case, sets forth in writing in the
record of the case its reason for granting such continuance.
S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161(c)(8) (1971). Continuances granted under this provision
have no seven-day length limitation as do continuances available to the prosecution and
defendant under sections (c)(6) and (7). See note 65 supra. The strict requirements of
this section appear designed to prevent its wholesale use to destroy the effectiveness of
the entire law, and the inapplicability of the seven-day limitation is perhaps designed
to preserve some flexibility for special situations such as the prosecution of large and
complex conspiracy cases.
72 E.g., ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 400; 2D. Cut. R. 5(h).
Flexibility in the Second Circuit is assured since, besides a catchall "exceptional
circumstance" clause, a special provision allows the prosecution "additional time to pre-
pare the government's case (when] additional time is justified by the exceptional circum-
sta ces." 2D Cmx. R. 5(c)(ii).
\73 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970). Because of the statute's narrowly
drawn exclusions, Illinois courts have interpreted time limits strictly against the state,
placing an affirmative duty on the state to comply with the 120-day time limit for trial
of those in custody. E.g., People v. Siglar, 127 Ill. App. 2d 256, 261 N.E.2d 27 (1970).
For those released on bail or personal recognizance pending trial, however, the demand
rule has been specifically retained in the statute. Id. § 103-5(b).
74 See note 115 infra.
E.g., FLA. R. Crum. P. 3.191(f): "[Elxceptional circumstances shall not include
geWral congestion of the court's docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain
available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays." This provision is consistent
with Florida cases decided prior to the new rule. E.g., State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So.
2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1970).
The ABA proposal agrees that general court congestion is no excuse for noncom-
pliance with the statutory time limits; it does recommend, however, a provision excluding
from computation of time limits "[t]he period of delay resulting from congestion of the
trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances." ABA
STANDARDS § 2.3(b). This provision is explained in the comments:
Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose
of the usual business of the court promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose
the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced
an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Thus, when a large-scale
riot or other mass public disorder has occurred, some leeway for additional time
is required to ensure that the many resulting cases may receive adequate attention
from the prosecutor's office, defense counsel (possibly a single defender office),
and the judiciary.




Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides that if there
is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may
dismiss the charges against him. The dismissal is thus not mandatory
and may be ordered without prejudice, with the result that the accused
may be reindicted on the same offense or on another offense arising
out of the same criminal episode.76 Some older state statutes model
after the English Habeas Corpus Act 77 provide that the charges must
be dismissed when time limits are exceeded but that such dismissal
does not bar subsequent prosecution. Others provide that such a
discharge bars subsequent reprosecution of misdemeanors but not of
felonies79
The ABA proposal recommends that if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the terms of the statute, the charges should be dismissed
with prejudice; 0 any subsequent prosecution on the same offense or
on offenses required to be joined with that offense would thus be barred.
Most modern speedy trial plans adopt a similar sanction.8' The reason-
ing behind such a strong sanction is that
[i]f, following undue delay in going to trial, the prosecution is free
to commence prosecution again for the same offence, subject
only to the running of the statute of limitations, the right to
speedy trial is largely meaningless.8 2
76 See Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v.
Mark II Electronics, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 280 (D. La. 1968).
77 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
78 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-18-06 (1960); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.010 (1961),
interpreted by State v. Christensen, 75 Wash. 2d 678, 453 P.2d 644 (1969).
79 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-6 (1953); see Note, A Look at the New Second Circuit
Rules for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 56 MINN. L. REv. 73, 83 (1971).
80 ABA STANDAiDS § 4.1.
81 E.g., S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3162 (1971); FLA. R. CrIa. P. 3.191(h)(1); N.M.R.'
Crv. P. 95. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1141(e) (Smith-Hurd 1970); N.Y. CODE Casat. )
PRO. § 210.20(1)(g)(4) (McKinney 1971); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 126 (1966)/
(dissenting opinion).
California courts have consistently held that dismissal under the state's speedy trial
law (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970)) does not preclude the filing of a second com-
plaint on the same charge. The judge may dismiss the case with prejudice in his dis-
cretion. People v. Hernandez, 250 Cal. App. 2d 842, 58 Cal. Rptr. 835 (2d Dist. 1967);
People v. Nooner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 723, 23 Cal. Rptr. 355 (3d Dist. 1962); People v.
Sorrentino, 146 Cal. App. 2d 149, 303 P.2d 859, (1st Dist. 1956).
82 ABA STANDAms § 4.1, Comment at 4041; see Hearings 21 (testimony of Senator
P. Hart). In recommending that the proposed federal statute require dismissal with
prejudice as a sanction for noncompliance, Senator Hart said, "A 'rollover' provision
for dismissal without prejudice, under which charges could be reinstated, would not
afford adequate incentive to speedy trial, even if leave of the court were required." Id.
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By prohibiting further prosecution of the defendant for the same of-
fense or an offense required to be joined originally, the statutes prevent
prosecutors from "circumvent[ing] the speedy trial requirements by
unduly delaying trial on one charge and then subsequently proceeding
on another closely related charge."8 8 s Even when a speedy trial scheme
rejects the demand rule,8 4 it may require that once the time limits
have been exceeded a defendant must either make a motion before
trial that the charges be dismissed or be considered to have waived his
ht to dismissal.85
Critics of speedy trial formulations have voiced concern that delay
beyond the time limits-especially delay which results in dismissal with
prejudice even when occasioned only by court congestion-will in
e ect create a "legalized jail break."?6 Proponents maintain that "a
bill without teeth will only repeat the policy declarations from the
judici and the bar favoring speedy trials"8 '7 without ensuring corn-
liance. Dismissal with prejudice would seem to be a necessary element
of any scheme that purports to place an affirmative duty8 on the state
to comply with prompt trial time limits.
IV
EFFECTS OF SPEEDY TRIAL SCHEMES
A well-drafted, effectively enforced speedy trial scheme should ac-
complish what the majority of courts have been unwilling to do under
the constitutional speedy trial guarantee-place an affirmative duty
on the state to bring the accused to justice within certain reasonable
time limits. But such formulations can and should accomplish much
83 ABA STANDARDS § 4.1, Comment at 41.
84 See text accompanying notes 98-101 infra.
85 E.g., ch. 184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 398; 2D CIR. R. 8; see People v. House, 10 Ill.
App. 2d 556, 558, 141 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1957); S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3162 (1971).
The rule that a defendant must move for dismissal on speedy trial grounds prior to
trial is not as harsh as the requirement that he demand a speedy trial as a prerequisite to
statutory protection. Under more modern schemes, the latter type of demand rule is
eliminated. See notes 98-101 infra. The rationale behind requiring a motion for dismissal
under the statute is that the right to a speedy trial, as a personal right, may be waived
if not asserted before trial. See ABA STANDARDS § 4.1, Comment at 41. A defendant not
represented by counsel should not be required to make a motion for discharge. See 2D Ci.
R. 8; 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.5; cf. note 65 supra.
86 Burton B. Roberts, Bronx District Attorney and President, New York Ass'n of
District Attorneys, quoted in N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1971, at 35, col. 8.
87 Hearings 21 (testimony of Senator P. Hart).




more. By commanding the release of defendants who are not brought to
trial within the prescribed time, such schemes may coerce those in
charge of funds to allocate additional resources for the administration,
of criminal justice. By ensuring that defendants will be brought to
trial within a period short enough to minimize the risks of pretrial
crime, speedy trial plans may enhance the attractiveness of bail reform
measures as alternatives to preventive detention. But at the same time
the formulas may yield undesirable consequences. Sacrificing the rights
of the accused, for example, may present an all too convenient way to
meet the time limits.
A. Effect on Prejudice, the Demand Rule, and the Purposeful or
Oppressive Test
A few courts have either interpreted the demand rule as incom-
patible with the constitutional speedy trial guarantee 9 or have abolished
the requirement of proving actual prejudice90 or purposeful delay, by
the prosecution 91 even in the absence of a prompt trial statute. The
Supreme Court has yet to address these questions.92 If court rules and
statutes designed to expedite criminal trials are to be truly effective
both in establishing new standards for defining the constitutional
guarantee and in assuring fairness to both the public and the
accused, they must place upon the state an affirmative obligation to
bring the accused to trial promptly. Not all speedy trial schemes by
their terms impose such an obligation.
1. Effect on Prejudice
Judicially developed notions that the defendant has the burden of
proving actual prejudice resulting from delay must be abandoned by
any speedy trial plan which seeks to place an affirmative duty on the
89 E.g., State v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955); see note 33 and accom-
panying text supra.
90 Hinton v. United States, 424 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Blanca
Perez, 310 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); see notes 18 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
91 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
92 In his concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), Mr. Justice
Brennan observes:
I do not read the Court's opinion as deciding that in post-Klopfer cases ...
(2) [the defendant] is not entitled to a speedy trial unless he demands it at the
time of the delay; (3) he must prove actual prejudice, or (4) the delay must be
deliberately caused by the government. It is timely to note that the Court has as
yet givemr scant attention to these and other questions essential to the definition
of the speedy-trial guarantee.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
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state. When the statutory or regulatory time limit has passed, prejudice
should be presumed and the burden placed upon the prosecutor to
show that the delay was specifically permitted or excused.93 Presuming
prejudice when delay exceeds the prescribed time limits has the effect
of placing at least a limited affirmative duty on the state to try defen-
dants with dispatch.94 Most modem prompt trial formulas implicitly
create a presumption of prejudice when delay exceeds the time limit
as extended by specific exclusions. 95
2. Effect on the Demand Rule
The demand rule has come under increasing attack by those who
feel the state should have a constitutional duty to provide a speedy
trial.9 6 The rule places on the defendant the burden of demanding a
speedy trial or being considered to have waived the right.97 The ABA
proposal suggests that the demand rule be explicitly eliminated in any
speedy trial rule or statute.98 Both the Second Circuit rule 9 and the
93 See People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 151, 383 P.2d 452, 460, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 52
(1963) (dictum) (defendant need not show prejudice to assert his rights under the California
statute). Several years later People v. Bryant, 5 Cal. App. 3d 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. 388 (2d
Dist. 1970), held:
Section 1382 subdivision 2, Penal Code, requires a dismissal unless good cause
is shown why defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days after the filing of
an information; when such an issue arises before trial, prejudice will be presumed
from a defendant's right to a speedy trial unless the People successfully meet
their burden of showing good cause for delay.
Id. at 571, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 394, citing People v. Wilson, supra.
If, however, violation of the time limit is asserted on appeal, the defendant in Cali-
fornia still must prove prejudice from the delay. People v. Wilson, supra at 151-52, 383
P.2d at 460, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 52; People v. Ludviksen, 8 Cal. App. 3d 996, 999, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 783 (1st Dist. 1970).
94 An Illinois appellate court has interpreted the state's speedy trial statute (ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970)) to require that prejudice be presumed
when no reason is shown for delay exceeding the statutory time limit: "The burden is
upon the State to promptly try offenses where a defendant is within the jurisdiction."
People v. Olbrot, 118 Ill. App. 2d 142, 149, 254 NXE.2d 849, 852 (1969).
95 See note 93 and accompanying text supra. In Alo v. United States, 439 F.2d 751,
755 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971), the Second Circuit noted that under
its rules the defendant would have been relieved of the burden of proving actual prejudice.
Since the case was decided (and the indictment filed) before the effective date of the rules,
however, the court refused to relieve the defendant of that burden.
96 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
97 See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
98 ABA STANDARDS § 2.2. Not only does elimination of the demand rule protect the
defendant, but it also serves the public interest in speeding up the judicial process. The
commentary to the ABA proposal states that "the trial of a criminal case should not
be unreasonably delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his
best interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge." Id. § 2.2, Comment at 17.
99 2D CiR. R. 8.
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former New York Judicial Conference plan'00 follow the ABA recom-
mendation .l01
Some speedy trial schemes implicitly or partially retain the demand
doctrine. 0 2 Others have explicitly retained it but have eliminated the
harshness of the waiver concept.103 Making demand a condition of dis-
100 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.5; see note 5 supra. The new New York statute does not ex-
plicitly mention the elimination of the demand rule. Ch. 184, [1972] N.Y. Laws 398. The
demand rule has been eliminated by judicial decision in New York, however. People v.
Prosser, 209 N.Y. 353, 180 N.E.2d 891 (1955); see note 33 supra.
101 The proposed federal statute, although not explicitly rejecting the demand doc-
trine, contains strong language delineating the government's affirmative duty to meet
speedy trial deadlines. It provides for dismissal of the charges "[ilf a defendant, through,
no fault of his own or his counsel, is not brought to trial [within the prescribed limits]."
S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3162 (1971) (emphasis added). This language apparently!
eliminates the demand doctrine as well as the doctrine of "purposeful or oppressive"
delay, unless defendant's "fault" can be interpreted to include failure to demand a prompt
trial.
10- Although the California statute makes no explicit mention of the demand ruleg.
a criminal case is continued beyond the 60-day limit and the defendant does 'not object
to such delay, it is presumed that the postponement met with his approval. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1382 (West 1970). Such "waiver by silence" is merely an alternative formulation
of the demand doctrine. See People v. Miller, 190 Cal. App. 2d 261, 265, 11 Cal. Rptr. 920,
922 (2d Dist.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 881 (1961).
Illinois specifically requires a defendant free on bail or his own recognizance to demand
trial and only then requires that he be brought to trial within 160 days. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 28, § 103-5(b) (Smith-Hurd 1970). But no demand is required of a defendant in jail
pending trial for him to be protected under the statute's 120-day rule. Id. § 103-5(a); see
Village of Midlothian v. Walling, 118 Il. App. 2d 358, 255 N.E.2d 23 (1969); People v.
Rockett, 85 Ill. App. 2d 24, 228 N.E.2d 219 (1967). Indiana, on the other hand, retains
the demand rule for defendants in jail but not for defendants on recognizance. IND. R.
Cwam. P. 4. The Wisconsin law retains the demand rule only in felony cases (Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 971.10 (1971)) and Iowa eliminates the demand rule if the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel (IowA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1972)). See also State v. Christensen,
75 Wash. 2d 678, 684, 453 P.2d 644, 648 (1969) (construing Washington statute as retaining
the demand rule).
103 E.g., FLA. R. CalM. P. 3.191(a)(2). Under this rule if a defendant demands trial
he must be tried within 60 days of his demand. But even without demand, if the offense
is a misdemeanor the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days of the filing
of the indictment or information, or within 180 days if the crime charged is a felony. Id.
R. 3.191(a)(1). Failure to demand trial, therefore, merely lengthens the time limit but does
not constitute a waiver of the statutory right to be tried within some definite period.
Those in prison in Florida because of other convictions also may demand trial on pending
charges and therefore be subject to a shorter time limit than those who do not. Id.
Ri. 3.191(b)(l)-(b)(2). Prisoners outside the state charged with a crime in Florida must
demand trial to trigger the running of a six-month time limit. Id. R. 3.191(b)(3).
The ABA proposal indicates that a demand requirement for those imprisoned for
other crimes is not inconsistent with the general no-demand policy:
The prisoner should have the option (1) of demanding trial in order to overcome
whatever disadvantages may flow from the fact a detainer has been lodged
against him, or (2) of not making the demand in the hope the charges will be
dropped before or at the time he completes his sentence.
ABA STANDAms § 2.2, Comment at 18.
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charge following delay beyond the time limits is not equivalent to re-
quiring demand for a prompt trial. 1°4 The former concept merely
recognizes that the defendant may waive statutory dismissal by not
making a motion for it; the latter places the burden on the defendant
to ensure that the state complies with its deadlines. If the state is to
have an affirmative duty to provide speedy trials, the defendant should
not have this burden.
3. Effect on the Purposeful or Oppressive Test
Judicial interpretation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial
often required the defense to prove that delay was caused by the
laches or "purposeful or oppressive" conduct of the prosecution.10 5 Al-
though some schemes explicitly address this question,1 6 most leave to
judicial interpretation the question of whether delay other than that
caused by the purposeful or oppressive conduct of the prosecution is
excused.107
Although the purposeful or oppressive test was adequate in a time
when prosecutorial procrastination was the chief cause of pretrial delay
the test seems grossly inadequate today. The primary cause of delay
today is the congestion of court calendars, 08 although some delay may
be occasioned by intentional dilatory tactics of either defense or prose-
cution. A speedy trial scheme which condones delay based on court
congestion, though perhaps relieving some of the harshness of tradi-
tional constitutional interpretation, will fail to achieve a primary
goal-speeding up the judicial process.
Even before adoption of the present Florida rule which explicitly
excludes general court congestion from those "exceptional circum-
stances" which justify delay, 0 9 the Florida Supreme Court held court
104 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
105 E.g., Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957); see notes 20-22 and ac-
companying text supra. But see note 30 and accompanying text supra.
106 E.g., FILA. R. CaRIm. P. 3.191(i), which explicitly provides that general court con-
gestion does not justify delay; see note 75 supa. But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1710 (1964);
IND. R. Cart. P. 4; Oto Rv. CoDE ANN. § 2945.72 (Anderson 1954). These three states
explicitly excuse delay occasioned by congestion in the courts.
107 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra. Even in a proposed addition to
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which would set specific time limits
for each stage of the criminal process, the Judicial Conference of the United States ex-
plicitly refused to take a position on the question of whether court -ongestion should be
considered an adequate excuse for delay. The question would be left to the discretion of
each district court. Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 45, Advisory Comm. Note 11-12 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1971). Such specific time limits were ultimately rejected by the Judicial Con-
ference in favor of the less stringent proposed Rule 50(b). See note 142 infra.
108 See People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 422, 267 N.E.2d 263, 265, 318 N.YS.2d 484,
486 (1971); Introduction to ABA STANDARDS 1.
109 FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.191(f); see notes 75 & 108 supra.
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congestion to be inadequate justification for violation of an earlier
statutory110 time limit."" In rejecting the purposeful test of delay, the
court in an even earlier case said, "The accused is entitled to a speedy
trial and the only delay which is to be excused is delay which is caused
by the accused.""12 Florida courts have thus been quite determined,
through their opinions and promulgation of new court rules, to place
an affirmative burden on the state to provide speedy trials to criminal
defendants.
On the other hand, courts and legislatures have sometimes been
reluctant to extend statutory protection to defendants when delay is
not attributable to the prosecution. The Second Circuit rules do not
require that a trial be held within the prescribed time limits, but only
require that within that time "the government . . . be ready for
trial."" 3 The New York legislature, in response to a Judicial Confer-
ence rule that would have required the dismissal of charges if a defen-
dant were not tried within six months, enacted a similar "ready
rule."1 4 Delay caused by docket congestion is therefore implicitly ex-
cluded; this omission makes such rules and legislation an incomplete
answer to the problem of trial delay.
A court system with inadequate resources to relieve its congested
calendars is in a quandary. It must fear public reaction if it is forced to
release a great number of accused criminals because of its inability to
meet trial deadlines; yet it is violating the speedy trial guarantee if it
does not release them. There are only limited alternatives. A court
could ignore delay owing to court congestion, either by attacking only
prosecutorial delay as was the approach of the Second Circuit, or by
11o Law of July 2, 1970, ch. 70-339, § 107, [1970] Fla. Laws 1040 (repealed 1971).
111 State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1970).
112 State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 233 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 1970).
Although under the new Florida rule the prosecution can obtain a continuance for
failure after a diligent effort to obtain a material witness (FLA. R. CRnm. P. 3.191(f)(iii)),
in the absence of such an express continuance the unavailability of a state's witness does
not toll the running of the statutory time limit. See Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720
(Fla. App. 1970). See also People v. Siglar, 127 II. App. 2d 256, 261 N.E.2d 27 (1970):
[T]he burden of taking steps necessary to bring about a prompt trial [within 120
days] rests with the People.... Unless the delay is occasioned by the defendant,
failure to try him within the time specified entities him to discharge.
Id. at 260, 261 N.E.2d at 29 (citations omitted).
113 2D Cm. Ri. 3-4. One commentator suggests that the Second Circuit's attitude re-
flects the opinion that under the present conditions, "application of the rules to [delay
caused by court congestion] would produce far too drastic an effect." Comment, Speedy
Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71
COLUM. L. Ray. 1059, 1074 (1971).
114 Ch. 184, [1972] N.Y. Laws 398; see note 5 supra. Such a rule, guarding as it does
only against delay by the prosecution, is of little aid to the defendant who must continue
to wait many months for trial due to the congested condition of the court's docket.
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
characterizing court congestion as "good cause" for delay and therefore
excusable.115 Second, it could order the discharge of any person who,
without fault of his own, is not brought to trial in accordance with the
time limits. This method might effectively force the legislature to
allocate more resources for criminal justice administration.11" Third,
if available resources are not increased, the courts could adopt short-
cuts in criminal procedure. This alternative would threaten the con-
stitutional rights of the accused,117 but would enable a court to avoid
the mass release of persons charged with criminal offenses.
Whether court congestion is good cause for delay is in many ju-
risdictions still an unanswered question.118 A recent New York case,
although decided prior to either the Judicial Conference rule or the leg-
islative "ready rule,"119 illustrates judicial disagreement on this issue.
In People v. Ganci,120 decided under New York's former Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, 12 1 the defendant's trial was delayed for sixteen months
122
115 Most modem speedy trial schemes do not specify whether court congestion is
good cause for delay. See notes 72-75 & 106 and accompanying text supra. In Application
of Hansen, 387 P.2d 659 (Nev. 1963), owing to docket congestion the defendant was not
brought to trial within the statutory time limit of 60 days. The opinion of the lower
court that no speedy trial violation had occurred was affirmed. Id. at 660. A similar
statute is in effect today in Nevada. NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.556 (1968). Rather than pro-
viding a "good cause" exception, the law states that the court "may" dismiss the indict-
ment if it is continued beyond the time limit. See also State v. Dunn, 70 Wash. 2d 572,
576, 424 P.2d 897, 899-900 (1967) (construing congested trial docket as "good cause" under
state statute).
116 See notes 131-44 and accompanying text infra.
117 See notes 149 & 152 and accompanying text infra.
118 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra. But see note 106 supra. In California
a very early case held that the state has a "special duty" under the speedy trial law: "the
mere statement of the judge that the court has been otherwise engaged does not show
good cause." People v. Buckley, 116 Cal. 146, 153, 47 P. 1009, 1012 (1897). But see Murphy
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 6, 200 P. 483 (1st Dist. 1921); People v. Holmes, 13 Cal.
App. 212, 216, 109 P. 489, 490-91 (2d Dist. 1910).
In In re Vacca, 125 Cal. App. 2d 751, 271 P.2d 162 (1st Dist. 1954), the Califoria
Superior Court was operating under a rule which provided that the departments handling
criminal cases "shall be sufficient in number to hear all criminal cases within the time
required by law." Id. at 753, 271 P.2d at 163. Under this rule, continuances beyond the
time limit "solely on the ground that the court was then engaged in the trial of other
defendants whose cases preceded in date of information fied that of this petitioner" were
held not to be for good cause. Id. at 752, 271 P.2d at 163. Today the superior courts of Los
Angeles and San Francisco counties operate under a similar rule. CAL. SuPm Or. R. 248(a).
But cf. In re Lopez, 39 Cal. 2d 118, 120, 245 P.2d 1, 3 (1952) (initial delay beyond 60 days
was with defendant's consent, and delay thereafter held reasonable because of court con-
gestion).
119 See notes 5 & 114 supra.
120 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971).
121 The former Code of Criminal Procedure provided that a defendant must be
brought to trial within the next term of court after indictment but contained a broad
"good cause" provision excusing delay. N.Y. CODE CEUM. PRO. § 668 (1953).
122 Defendant was continuously incarcerated from June 1967 to the date set for his
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owing to the fault of neither the defense nor the prosecution. The
delay was attributable to "the congestion of the criminal trial calendar
in Nassau County and the well-founded policy to process indictments
in the sequence of their presentment. 12 Nassau County courts at that
time were so congested that those in jail waited up to six months for
trial, while those released prior to trial experienced delays of up to
eighteen months. 124 Judge Bergan, writing for the majority, interpreted
the state speedy trial guarantee as protecting a defendant only from
prosecutorial delay: "[T]he delay is not here chargeable to the prose-
cutor and... it occurred for reasons beyond his control or the control
of the court; hence ... there was 'good cause' shown under code sec-
tion 668 for not dismissing the indictment.'
12 5
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Fuld,12 6 citing People v. Pros-
ser12 7 as authority for placing an affirmative duty on the state to provide
speedy trials, stated:
[T]he fact that such delay was attributable to congested calendar
conditions in Nassau County and that the district attorney was
"ready" and judges "willing" to hear the case seems to me beside
the point. As far as the defendant is concerned, he suffered the de-
nial of a speedy trial whether the prosecutor or the court was at
fault or completely blameless....
... [lt is the responsibility of the State, or of its subdivisions,
to do what is necessary-by furnishing funds, facilities and person-
nel-to assure the effective operation of the judicial system, and
that burden may not be shifted to the defendant. The rule is sim-
ply stated: constitution and statutes mandate a speedy trial, and it
is incumbent on the State to provide it.128
trial, September 30, 1968, a total of nearly 16 months. People v. Gand, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 421,
267 N.E.2d 263, 264, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (1971).
123 Id. at 422, 267 N.E.2d at 265, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
124 See id., 267 N.E.2d at 265, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87.
125 Id. at 423, 267 N.E.2d at 265, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
128 As Chief Judge of the State of New York and Chairman of the Administrative
Board of the Judicial Conference, Stanley H. Fuld was a major force behind the Judicial
Conference rule that was ultimately superseded by the legislative "ready rule." See note 5
supra; N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1971, at 35, col. 6.
127 309 N.Y. 358, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955). In eliminating the demand rule in New York,
the Prosser court spoke of the right to a speedy trial as placing an affirmative obligation
on the state. See note 33 supra.
128 27 N.Y.2d at 430-31, 267 N.E.2d at 270, 318 N.YS.2d at 494 (dissenting opinion).
Counsel for the petitioner had argued:
The State has an affirmative duty to offer a forum to the accused within a short
time after his arrest in order to avoid prolonged imprisonment of the defendant,
sustained public suspicion, and delay making exculpatory proof difficult for the
defendant to obtain.
Appellant submits that under no conceivable reasoning can the constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial be subordinated to accommodate the inefficiency of
the state's judicial system ....
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The New York position on delay caused by court congestion has
since been clarified. The Judicial Conference rule, although excluding
delay caused by "exceptional circumstances," apparently would have
included delay caused by court congestion in the computation of
its time periods. 129 The legislative "ready rule" nullified the more en-
lightened Judicial Conference approach and avoided the issue by fo-
cusing solely on prosecutorial delay.
130
B. Compelling Legislative Bodies To Allocate More Resources to the
Judiciary
In a recent Pennsylvania case,131 a court of common pleas insti-
tuted a mandamus proceeding to compel the mayor and city council
of Philadelphia to appropriate additional funds for the administration
of the court. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Bell, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held the mandamus proceeding permissible, stat-
ing that the judiciary
must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment
of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry
out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to ad-
minister Justice, if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent
Branch of our Government. 32
Philadelphia's fiscal crisis was held to be no excuse for not providing
such reasonable and necessary sums.133
The burden upon the People to expedite the prosecution of criminal cases
rests not only on the District Attorney, but upon the State of New York.
Brief for Appellant at 14-17, People v. Gand, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d
484 (1971).
129 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.3(c)(6); see note 5 supra.
180 Ch. 184, [1972] N.Y. Laws 398. But see People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 279, 270
N.E.2d 200, 321 N.Y.S.2d 570, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971), also decided prior to either
the Judicial Conference or legislative rules. Relying on the dissent in Ganci, the court
stated:
But even [in Ganci] two of the Judges of the court were of opinion that the
lack of public trial facilities was not good enough a ground to excuse the 16-month
delay ... and the period there considered seems to have approached the excusable
limit of delay attributable to the absence of public trial facilities.
Id. at 281, 270 N.E.2d at 301, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
131 Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, No. 3084 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Nov.
2, 1970).
132 Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197, cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (emphasis in original). See Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit
v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969); Leahy v. Farrel, 362 Pa.
52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949). In New York City, the Board of Corrections has filed suit in federal
court to force the state government to allocate more funds to criminal justice administra-
tion and to compel the courts to set up a special bail review section to relieve overcrowd-
ing in the city jails. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
133 "Mhe deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to the Constitu-
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Judicially enacted speedy trial rules are an indirect and somewhat
more subtle way to coerce state legislatures and other fiscal bodies to
appropriate more funds for the processing of criminal cases.18 4 For the
courts to meet the specific deadlines set forth in the rules, more money
will have to be allocated to all component parts of the criminal justice
system; more judges, courtrooms, prosecutors, legal aid personnel, pub-
lic defenders, and probation officers will be necessary. 3,
The New York rule adopted by the state's Judicial Conference,13
for example, was accompanied by a special caveat to the makers of fiscal
policy. In a press release issued at the time the rules were made public,
Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, Chairman of the Administrative Board
of the Judicial Conference, stated:
The Administrative Board is thoroughly aware of the fact that,
if these rules are to prove effective, the wherewithal for additional
facilities, personnel and services, so long denied to the courts and
tional mandate that the Judiciary shall be free and independent and able to provide an
efficient and effective system of Justice." Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45,
56, 274 A.2d 193, 199. See E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS 79
(1971).
134 In dismissing charges against a defendant because he was denied his right to a
speedy trial, a Florida court recently stated:
The County Solicitor. . . has very effectively presented the plight of the courts
in [his] county in processing a backlog of a thousand cases per month, but we feel
that this appeal should be made to the legislature and not to this court.
Leonard v. McIntosh, 237 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. App. 1970) (emphasis added). People v.
Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 424, 267 N.E.2d 263, 266, 818 N.Y.S.2d 484, 488 (1971) stated:
If there are many dismissals of serious criminal charges because courts and prose-
cutors have too many cases to process in spite of full diligence, hopefully public
opinion will spur State and local legislative bodies and administrators to provide
money for additional services and facilities.
The Ganci court, however, declined to provide such a "spur" by releasing the defendant.
See notes 120-128 and accompanying text supra. But see E. FRIESEN, E. GALIAS & N. GALAS,
supra note 133, at 79:
A form of judicial extortion aimed at forcing the taxing and spending authority
to provide additional funds to the courts is unlikely to have a positive impact on
a long-range basis. If the confrontation reaches such a point, it would appear
wiser to build a public record on the need.
135 In New York, it was estimated that at least $14 million would have been needed
to implement the Judicial Conference rules completely. The City of New York alone would
have required a bare minimum of $7 million in additional resources to implement the
rule. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1971, at 35, col. 6. The five district attorneys for the City of New
York predicted that the city would need 32 new courtrooms. The Legal Aid Society in the
City had planned to request an additional $5 million to prepare itself for adherence to the
new deadlines. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, at 28, col. 1. The state legislature completely
avoided the problem of adequately funding the courts when it enacted a "ready rule" to
supersede the Judicial Conference plan. See notes 5, 113-14, 129-30 and accompanying text
supra.
136 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29; see note 5 supra.
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other agencies involved will have to be made available by those
having control of the purse strings.
1 37
Inadequate funding of criminal justice administration ensures that
trial deadlines will not be met. The result may be mass dismissals and
releases from jail.38  Alternatively, the consequence of insufficient re-
sources may be the elimination of what one judge has called the "pro-
cedural luxuries" safeguarding constitutional rights of the accused.13 9
Despite the provision in many schemes for a delayed effective
date, 40 problems of providing funds for the new schemes remain sub-
137 Judicial Conference of the State of New York, Press Release, April 30, 1971. Judge
Fuld reiterated this point several times throughout the release and concluded:
[I]t now remains for the other coordinate branches of government to carry out
their responsibilities and provide the necessary funds for the construction of fa-
cilities, for the procurement of additional prosecutors, public defenders, proba-
tion and correction and court personnel and for other essential auxiliary services.
Id.
188 "Several hundred" cases have reputedly been dismissed for failure to comply with
Florida's rule. Kleindeinst, Toward Speedy Justice, TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1971, at 13. Bronx
District Attorney Burton B. Roberts was concerned that such might have been the result
under the Judicial Conference plan: "If we don't get the wherewithal for additional per-
sonnel and new facilities . ., thousands of hardened criminals will walk out of jail." N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1971, at 51, col. 6. The New York legislature, unwilling to make the neces-
sary allocations, found this danger all too real and thus passed a "ready rule" to supersede
the proposed plan. See notes 5, 114, 129-30 and accompanying text iupra.
139 People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 425, 267 N.E.2d 263, 267, 318 N.YS.2d 484, 489
(1971); see notes 148-52 and accompanying text infra.
140 The period of the delay between promulgation or enactment and effectiveness
varies. The Florida rule (FLA. R. C~an. P. 3.191(i)(1)) allowed only 30 days between adop-
tion and effectiveness, but Florida case law and prior statutes had supplied the ground-
work for the new scheme's implementation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d
281 (Fla. 1970). The Second Circuit delayed the effective date of its statute for six months
(see 8 BNA CuM. L. REP. 2251 (1971)), New Mexico delayed 4Y months (N.M.R. Crv. P.
95), and the effective date of the Judicial Conference rule was delayed one year (22 N.Y.
C.R.R. § 29). The New York statute, however, was immediately put into effect after its
enactment in order to prevent the Judicial Conference rule from taking effect. Ch. 184,
[1972] N.Y. Laws 398; see note 5 supra.
The proposed federal statute would apply different effective dates to different types
of crime. For example, with regard to defendants accused of violent or dangerous crimes
the law would become effective within 90 days after passage if the defendant is in jail
pending trial, and within 120 days if he is free on bail or recognizance. For other crimes,
the statute would apply after 180 days to those held in custody prior to trial, but only
after 18 months to those free on bail or recognizance. S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3163
(1971). A district court may request an extension of the effective date. Id. § 3164. One
observer, however, has argued that the right to a speedy trial is so fundamental that in
all cases the Act should become effective within six months of its enactment, and that any
extension of time granted to a particular district court should be limited to 90 days.
"Without a limit, the implementation of the speedy trial plan in a district might be
indefinitely delayed, and the Act could become merely precatory." Hearings 36 (testi-
mony of D. A. Rezneck).
Most of the new speedy trial rules are not retroactive, but only apply to those arrested
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stantial.141 Whether a speedy trial plan should be implemented by court
rules or by legislation directly relates to the financing problem.142 Those
favoring judicially promulgated rules dealing with speedy trials feel
that the judiciary is best able to assess its own capabilities and design
rules which reflect a realistic appraisal of the congestion problem. 143
or indicted after the effective date. See, e.g., FLA. R. Carp. P. 3.191(i)(1); N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1971, at 28, col. 3. The proposed federal rule would also apply time limits only prospec-
tively. S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3163 (1971). Senator Charles H. Percy has recommended,
however, that the law be made sufficiently retroactive to allow at least currently incarcer-
ated defendants to assert their right to a speedy trial. Hearings 69 (testimony of Senator
C. Percy).
141 In New York, for example, the unveiling of the speedy trial rule promulgated
by the Judicial Conference in April 1971 coincided with statewide and local fiscal cut-
backs. In New York the courts are financed predominantly on a local basis, despite repeated
legislative efforts to compel the state to take full financial responsibility. See (1971) Sen.
Int. No. 1980 (Messrs. Dunne & Garcia); (1971) Sen. Int. No. 1645-A (Messrs. Hughes &
Bloom); (1971) Assy. Int. No. 2673 (Mr. Crawford); note 135 supra.
142 An amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FED. R. Cu-M. P.
50(b)) has recently been approved (11 BNA CiM. L. REP. 3014 (1972)) and a congressional
speedy trial bill is currently pending (S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)). New Rule 50(b)
requires that each district court prepare a plan outlining procedures for the prompt dis-
position of criminal cases. Each plan is required to include rules relating to time limits
for each stage of the criminal process after indictment. The plans are subject to the ap-
proval of the judicial council of the appropriate circuit sitting together with the chief
judge of the district. The Advisory Committee Note to the Rule suggests that such a pro-
cedure, permitting variations in the time limits from district to district, would permit a
flexibility not provided for in the proposed federal statute. The rule "permits each dis-
trict court to establish time limits that are appropriate in light of its criminal caseload,
frequency of grand jury meetings, and any other factors which affect the progress of crim-
inal actions." FD. R. Qm. P. 50(b), Advisory Comm. Note. For similar reasons, the United
States Judicial Conference has not recommended passage of a speedy trial bill. See JUDiCIAL
CONFEnN E or THE UNrrED STATES, supra note 4, at 55-56 (1970).
Before approving Proposed Rule 50(b) the Judicial Conference of the United States
had outlined two alternative drafts of speedy trial schemes to be implemented by amend-
ment of Rule 45 of the Criminal Rules. The first was nearly identical to Proposed Rule
50(b). The second set specific time limits for the various stages of the criminal process,
including a 90-day limit between arraignment and trial for defendants held in custody
prior to trial, and 180 days for defendants not in custody. Failure to meet these time
limits, however, did not require dismissal. Ultimately the Judicial Conference recommended
the first draft in the form of an addition to Rule 50 rather than to Rule 45. Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Alternative Drafts
of Proposed Amendments to Rule 45 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (March 1971);
see note 107 supra.
However flexible Rule 50(b) may be, it does not guarantee, as a statute would, the
congressional financial commitment necessary for effective implementation. See Hearings
21-22 (testimony of Senator P. Hart). Unfortunately, a number of speedy trial bills have
died in congressional committees. E.g., H.R. 14822, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); S. 3936,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The current proposal (S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) has
been in committee since it was introduced on February 22, 1971. Rule 50(b), therefore, is
at least a beginning in setting explicit federal standards for speedy trials.
143 See, e.g., FED. R. Csia,. P. 50(b), Advisory Comm. Note. Florida by statute re-
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'-But without legislative participation, there is no assurance that suffi-
cient resources will be allocated to implement the rules.1 44 If the speedy
trial schemes are to be effective in expediting the judicial criminal
process while ensuring fairness to both the accused and the public, the
fiscal crisis of government must yield to the right to a speedy trial.
C. Effect on Preventive Detention
Although fairness to the accused is the major concern of speedy
-trial schemes, fairness to the public is also a fundamental consideration.
A recent government study has suggested that if all defendants were
tried within a period of sixty days from the time of their original ar-
rest, the likelihood of recidivism during a sixty-day period of pretrial
release would be minimal.145 Thus the successful implementation of a
speedy trial scheme having a short time limit for trials might minimize
public demand for greater pretrial detention of accused criminals 46
and might serve to complement bail reform.147 Speedy trial formula-
tions with time limits short enough to minimize the risk of pretrial
recidivism, coupled wth bail reform measures and rehabilitative ser-
vices-or at least supervision for those released prior to trial-would
be a salutary improvement of the current system.
pealed an early speedy trial law and provided that the state supreme court should set up
speedy trial procedures by rule of court. Ch. 71-1(B), §§ 6-7, [1971] Fla. Laws 3. The re-
sult was an interim rule, adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, which has now been
codified by the legislature. FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.191.
144 The potential for legislative-judicial conflict on this issue is well illustrated by
the New York experience. See notes 5, 113-14, 135 and accompanying text supra.
145 The National Bureau of Standards of the Department of Commerce, selected by
the Justice Department to conduct a study in Washington, D.C., found that "there is a
strong indication that crime on pretrial release in the District of Columbia is almost di-
rectly related to the man-days released." Quoted in Hearings on Preventive Detention
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970). The study indicated that during the first 60 days of release,
the likelihood of rearrest was very low, but after five to eight months of release pending
trial the statistical likelihood of a defendant committing another crime was quite high.
Id.
146 Senator Ervin feels that a law such as the proposed federal speedy trial legislation
(S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) would eliminate any necessity for preventive detention.
116 CONG. Rc. 15,887 (1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
147 Some advocates of bail reform feel that current bail systems operate more harshly
against the poor who are less able to raise bail money. See, e.g., Hearings 89-90 (testi-
mony of B. Just). Presumably a speedy trial scheme, especially one which also provides for
pretrial service agencies (e.g., S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3152-54 (1971)), would facilitate
release of many indigent defendants without bail. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146-52 (1970)), has as its goal reducing the number of defendants held in custody prior
to trial. Speedy trial schemes could help achieve this goal since "a judge would be more
willing to release a defendant on nonfinancial conditions knowing that the defendant
would be brought to trial within 60 days and in the interim would receive meaningful
supervision and assistance .... Hearings 89 (testimony of B. Just).
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D. Safeguarding the Rights of the Accused
In addition to protecting the accused, speedy trial schemes seek
to induce increased appropriations for criminal justice administration
and to stimulate more efficient judicial management. 148 But a speedy
trial scheme which in the name of improving court management speeds
up the administration of justice without adequately protecting other
rights of the accused would be self-defeating. Even if a fundamentai
cause of trial delay and court congestion has been growth in the range
of procedural safeguards afforded the accused,' 49 the way to accelerate
the judicial process is surely not to eliminate or bypass some of these
safeguards.
Recently, many administrative reforms have been introduced in
the judicial systems of various jurisdictions, some with relative suc-
cess. 150 In response to speedy trial deadlines, pressure for more inno-
vations in court management is likely to increase, especially if judicial
resources are not augmented.151 The proper vehicles for implementing
speedy trial schemes are court management reforms and increased fund-
ing, not abandonment of procedural safeguards. 1 2 Procedural safe-
148 See notes 131-44 and accompanying text supra. Professor Daniel J. Freed, in tes-
timony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, spoke of three majoi
themes of speedy trial schemes--"fixed time limits, better court management, and increased
system resources." Hearings 134.
149 A recent federal case outlined what the court believed to be the five major con-
tributors to court congestion: (1) growth in the number of crimes; (2) growth in procedural
safeguards of the accused; (3) increases in pretrial motions and hearings on search and
seizure, voluntariness of confessions, and witness identifications; (4) manpower shortages;
and (5) increases in applications for post-conviction relief. United States ex rel. Frizer v.
McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1971).
150 For a discussion of New York City's general efforts to develop more efficient meth-
ods of court management, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 5. Evening and weekend
courts have been instituted to help ease the backlog of criminal cases in New York City.
See id., Sept. 28, 1971, at 78, col. 1. It has also been suggested that judges in New York
City take shorter vacations. Id., May 24, 1971, at 35, col. 2. Such efforts have met with
some success: the 59,000 case backlog that existed in January 1971 had been cut to 28,000
by July 1, 1971. Id., Aug. 4, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
In Philadelphia, a program of preindictment probation has been instituted for first
offenders. If for a period of six months the released defendant stays out of trouble, charges
against him will be dismissed. It is expected that 12% to 15% of all criminal cases will
be handled this way, thus eliminating in many cases the need for a trial. Id., March 8, 1971,
at 26, col. 2. See generally E. FRiEsFN, E. GALLAs & N. GALLAs, supra note 133.
An attempt to tighten appellate procedure is evidenced by a resolution of the Judicial
Conference of the United States which suggests that trial counsel be appointed to conduct
all appeals, that efforts be made to perfect appeals without full trial transcripts, and that
use of printed briefs and oral argument be limited. Judicial Conference of the United
States, Resolution Concerning Delays in the Disposition of Appeals in the Federal Courts,
November 1, 1971.
151 See notes 131-46 and accompanying text supra.
152 The Justice Department has conditioned its support for a federal speedy trial
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guards and an expeditious criminal justice system are not inherently
contradictory; adequate protection of the accused should not serve as
an excuse to justify trial delay, nor should delay serve as a justification
for the abandonment of procedural safeguards.
CONCLUSION
Although speedy trial schemes may not alleviate all the pressing
problems of criminal justice delay, a well-designed plan operated by
adequately financed courts could be significantly effective and a valu-
able complement to other reform of the criminal justice system. It is
time that more states and the federal government reevaluate existing
statutes and court rules dealing with the speedy trial guarantee and
adopt measures which will ensure both judicial efficiency and proce-
dural fairness to the accused.
Allen P. Rubine
statute on the reform of the present federal habeas corpus law, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
Its proposal would bar post-conviction claims which are not "fundamental," such as claims
based on the "exclusionary rule" or failure to give Miranda warnings. Such a rule would
purportedly help alleviate court congestion and be more fair to prosecutors than the
speedy trial law standing alone. Hearings 107-14 (statement of W. H. Rehnquist). Rehn-
quist made other suggestions for reducing court congestion, including modification of the
exclusionary rule and implementation of a nonunanimous jury verdict. Id. at 107-08. Cf.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
Alleged "fairness" to the prosecution under the speedy trial time limits should not be
purchased at the cost of a defendant's ability to seek redress under habeas corpus if he feels
he was dealt with unfairly or unconstitutionally at trial. The concept of "fairness" to the
prosecution seems misplaced in a system in which the accused is presumed innocent until
the state meets its burden of proving guilt.
In People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971), Judge
Bergan suggests telescoping pretrial hearings into the main trial to achieve more prompt
disposition of cases. He describes "time-consuming protective procedures" as "procedural
luxuries." Id. at 424-25, 267 N.E.2d at 266-67, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89. Simultaneous presen-
tation of certain evidence before the judge and jury at trial, without a pretrial hearing
before the judge alone, raises constitutional questions, especially when the evidence is a
confession whose voluntariness is disputed.
I am unable ... to agree to the telescoping of what are now pretrial hearings into
the main trial. It will likely impinge on the existing constitutional rights of de-
fendants in limiting their opportunity to testify at the one and not at the other,
and in depriving them of the opportunity to plan for the trial of the main case.
. . . Disregarded entirely is the opportunity of the prosecution to appeal before
trial from adverse determinations on exclusions of evidence.
Id. at 430, 267 N.E.2d at 270, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (Breitel, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
